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City and Town Courts:
Mapping Their Dimensions
JuLIA LAMBER*
MARY LEE LUslN**
Limited jurisdiction courts in which the judges need not be legally trained
have long been a feature of the American judicial system.' All states have
limited jurisdiction courts, and more than forty allow some form of nonlawyer
judge.2 Typically, these courts deal with misdemeanors, traffic offenses, or
minor civil cases; more rarely they specialize in probate, juvenile, or domestic
matters.3 Until recently, no one paid much attention to limited jurisdiction
courts, but in the last fifteen years there have been several studies of these
courts and their judges. This literature includes national surveys on courts
of limited jurisdiction,4 general surveys about nonlawyer judges,5 and studies
of differences between lawyer and nonlawyer judges serving on the same
courts.6
The picture that emerges from this literature is one primarily of criminal
courts that exist because they are money-makers for their communities or
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington. B.A., 1969,
DePauw University; J.D., 1972, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington.
** Associate Professor of Criminal Justice, Indiana University. B.A., 1968, Creighton
University; M.A., 1970, Ph.D., 1978, University of Michigan. Our study was supported by a
grant from the Indiana Supreme Court. The points of view and opinions are ours and do not
necessarily represent those of the Indiana Supreme Court. We are especially grateful to Roberta
Herzberg, Michael Maxfield, and Roy Fleming for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
Dorothy Provine assisted us in developing our questionnaire.
1. Descended from medieval times through the English office of the justice of the peace,
such courts were established in the American colonies and taken westward with the frontier.
See J. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES (1960); D. PROVINE, JUDGING CREDENTIALS (1986);
L. SILBERMAN, NoN-ATTORNEY JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY (1979);
J. WUNDER, INFERIOR COURTS, SUPERIOR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
ON THE NORTHWEST FRONTIER, 1853-1889 (1979).
2. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, CoURTs OF LIMITED JURISDICTION: A NATIONAL SURVEY
(1977); see also D. PROVINE, supra note 1, at 85. States that require all judges to be lawyers
are California, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, and Massachusetts.
3. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 1-2206, 1-2208 (Supp. 1989) (Idaho's magistrate division of
the district court, probate, and juvenile); TExAs FRA. CODE ANN. § 51.04 (Vernon 1986)
(domestic relations and juvenile courts).
4. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MISDEMEANOR COURTS:
POLICY CONCERNS AND RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES (J. Alfini ed. 1981); AMERICAN JUDICATURE
SoCIETY, supra note 2.
5. L. SILBERMAN, supra note 1.
6. D. PROVINE, supra note 1. Both Provine and Silberman have extensive and useful
annotated bibliographies. See also J. KRESS & S. STANLEY, JUSTICE COURTS IN THE STATE OF
NEW YORK (1976); Ryan & Guterman, Lawyer v. Non-Lawyer Town Justices, 60 JUDICATURE
272 (1977).
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cheap sources of political patronage. Because the judges need not be legally
trained, they are perceived as too dependent on police and prosecutor.
Moreover, the judges are believed to be especially susceptible to local
economic, social, and political pressure and to personal prejudice, resulting
in questionable decisions.7 Although Doris Marie Provine's study of city
and village court judges in New York debunks the myth of differences
between lawyer and nonlawyer judges on these matters, her study does less
to challenge the picture of the courts themselves. Thus, these part-time
judicial institutions clash with notions of professionalism and of procedural
due process.
This Article evaluates the accuracy of the conventional picture by focusing
on the actual work of these courts. Understanding what these courts do,
who the judges are, and why the courts exist is important. As local
institutions of justice, these courts provide a context in which to consider
general issues of community and the role of local government in a democ-
racy. Community should be valued in democracies because, the argument
goes, it is here that full citizenship is acquired and lived. 8 These courts
constitute most people's only direct experience with the judicial branch. 9
Thus, lessons regarding justice and the nature of citizen participation in the
legal process will be learned in this context.
Communities and, by inference, local governmental institutions also are
presumed to be most responsive to citizen preferences. Yet their very
responsiveness raises the potential for abuse and the specter of majority
tyranny.l0 Critiques and defenses of these limited jurisdiction courts illustrate
this tension. Defenders praise the courts for offering accessible, inexpensive,
and timely justice in tune with local values. Critics fear that the power of
the court will be used in favor of those with personal ties to judges and
7. See, e.g., AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 3; D. PROVINE, supra note
1, at xii-xiv, 42-58, 91-93; L. SILBERMAN, supra note 1, at 8-16, 164-72. See also Ryan &
Guterman, supra note 6; Vanlandingham, The Decline of the Justice of the Peace, 12 U. KAN.
L. REV. 389 (1964).
8. This theme has a long history. See Long, The Citizenships: Local, State, and National,
23 URB. AFF. Q. 4 (1987). For a recent example of someone developing this view, see J.
MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (1980). See also G. CLARK, JUDGES AND THE
CITIES: INTERPRETING LOCAL AUTONOMY (1985) (the idea of community is important in both
liberal and leftist thinking).
9. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 8; Campbell, Foreword: Indiana
Justice of the Peace Courts-Problems and Alternatives for Reform, 8 IND. L. REV. 1, 1-2
(1974). The fact that most judicial proceedings consist of traffic offenses, minor criminal
offenses, and small civil disputes explains why these courts constitute a person's only judicial
experience. See also Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc., Highlights of a National Survey of
the General Public, Judges, Lawyers, and Community Leaders, in THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF
COURTS 4, 6 (1978) reprinted from STATE COURTS: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE (T. Fetter
ed. 1978) (self-reported knowledge of courts is highest for local courts, lower for state courts,
and lowest for the federal courts, the latter being the furthest removed from day-to-day life).
10. See R. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL (1982);
see also Sheldon, Due Process and the Lay Judge, 21 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 793 (1988).
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against those without political influence, such as community outsiders
(especially in traffic cases) or disadvantaged groups within the community.1'
These fears have fueled attempts to abolish these courts or, short of that,
to limit their potential harm by confining the courts' jurisdiction to the
most minor of matters or by requiring judges to be lawyers on the pre-
sumption that legal training enables one to resist improper pressure. 12
Finally, these courts represent an area of local responsibility and control
within the shrinking domain of local autonomy. 3 Since World War II,
power has shifted from local to higher levels of government. 4 Centralization
has occurred with respect to courts as well.' 5 Yet local, limited jurisdiction
courts have endured and even remain common. That these courts have done
so, despite social, economic, and technical change and in the face of
considerable hostility, attests to their importance to their communities. Local
autonomy implies the ability of a community to define itself by its choices,
and the choices a community makes within this sphere tell us something
about how the community defines itself.
The picture of these courts presented in the literature is fairly consistent,
but it has been drawn without much direct evidence on how these courts
operate. Moreover, it assumes homogeneity across time and place that may
be unwarranted. We consider one such court-Indiana's city and town
courts-to map the dimensions of variation and to explore the nature of
localism illustrated by these courts. The site of our research, Indiana,
illustrates several recurring themes in discussions of limited jurisdiction
courts. The state legislature planned to abolish the city and town courts in
11. Klonoski & Mendelsohn, The Allocation of Justice: A Political Approach, in THE
POLITICS OF LOCAL JUSTICE 17-18 (J. Klonoski & R. Mendelsohn eds. 1970), use limited
jurisdiction courts as examples of what they call a communal model of justice. See also
Vanlandingham, supra note 7, at 391; Wood, Suburbia: Its People & Their Politics, in THE
PoLITICs OF LOCAL JUSTICE, supra, at 61.
12. See, e.g., U.S. TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
THE COURTS 35 (1967); THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION, § 1.21, at 43 (1974); L.
SILBERMAN, supra note 1, at 104-10, 115-17.
13. See G. CLARK, supra note 8, at 6 (the meaning of local autonomy) and R. DAHL,
supra note 10, at 16-30.
14. Local governments are increasingly fiscally dependent on state and federal levels of
government. With this dependence has come regulation and a loss of political independence.
Stephens, State Centralization and the Erosion of Local Autonomy, 36 J. POL. 44 (1974),
finds an increased centralization of power even in so brief a period as the 1960s. Despite
various "New Federalisms," the trend apparently continues. See D. BERMAN, STATE AND
LOCAL POLITICS 40 (5th ed. 1987); N. HENRY, GOVERNING AT THE GRASSROOTS: STATE AND
LOCAL POLITICS 262 (1984).
15. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
JUDICIAL STRUCTURE: THE EFFECT OF UNIFICATION ON TRIAL COURT OPERATIONS 8 (1984);
Baar, Inter-Court Relations in Comparative Perspective: Toward an Ecology of Trial Courts,
12 JUST. SYS. J. 19, 23 (1987).
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1975 and again in 1979. Today, however, Indiana's cities and towns have
authority to create or abolish city and town courts for themselves. 6 In
1988, seventy-three communities opted for such a court, but the majority
of Indiana's cities and towns did not. Judges for these courts need not be
lawyers and, in 1988, more than half were not. 7
Part I discusses the jurisdiction of Indiana's city and town courts as well
as the survey design. Part II details the findings, providing general descrip-
tive information on the personnel, caseloads, and finances of the courts.
We discover a great diversity among courts including their caseloads, who
appears in court, and the money they make or lose. We show that the
general critique is accurate only in part and then only for a small percentage
of these courts. Part III explores the implications of these findings in more
general political terms.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Indiana Courts
Before 1970, Indiana courts of limited jurisdiction included justice of the
peace courts as well as city and town courts. The former courts were created
by the state constitution, 8 but an amendment in 1970 eliminated that
provision while restructuring the judiciary more generally. 19 A 1975 statute
abolished the justice of the peace courts effective January 1, 1976.20 The
state legislature then adopted a system of county courts, touted as a modern
system of limited jurisdiction courts, with jurisdiction over small civil claims,
minor criminal cases as well as infractions, and ordinance violations.2' As
16. IND. CODE § 33-10.1-1-3 (1988).
17. In our survey, 58% of the judges were nonlawyers. For more descriptive data, see
infra Part II.A.2.
18. IND. CONST. art. 7, § 14 (1851, repealed 1984).
19. H.R.J. Res. 12, 96th Gen. Assembly, 1975 Ind. Acts 1846. The constitutional amend-
ment removed the protection for justice of the peace courts and also changed the selection
process for court of appeals judges and supreme court justices from partisan elections to
selection by the governor from a list compiled by the Judicial Nominating Commission. How
the courts of limited jurisdiction should be restructured was the subject of intense legislative
debate for the next decade.
20. Act of May 5, 1975, Pub. L. No. 305, 1975 Ind. Acts 1667.
21. IND. CODE § 33-10.5-3-1 (1988). Originally, the civil jurisdiction of the county courts
was limited to $3000 in controversy. Today the limit is $10,000. In addition to misdemeanors,
infractions, and ordinance violations, county courts can hear Class D felonies, punishable by
a maximum four-year prison sentence. Id. § 35-50-2-7 (Supp. 1990). Judges are required to be
lawyers as well as United States citizens. Id. § 3-8-1-18 (1988). As originally contemplated, a
nonlawyer could also qualify by passing "a special examination administered by the supreme
court." Act of Feb. 26, 1976, Pub. L. No. 132, § 30, 1976 Ind. Acts 629, 648. But the state
supreme court, sua sponte, struck down that portion of the statute allowing for qualification
by examination. In re Judicial Interpretation of 1975 Senate Enrolled Act No. 441, 332 N.E.2d
97 (Ind. 1975).
Although the original legislation provided for most counties to have a county court (county
courts served 62 of the 92 counties), today there are 39 judges serving 40 counties. In some
counties, there is not enough litigation to support a separate court, and in others the caseloads
support an additional court of general, not limited, jurisdiction.
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part of this reform, city and town courts were also to be abolished, but
this move proved too controversial. A legislative compromise extended the
life of city and town courts until January 1, 1980. 22 Before their elimination,
however, the legislature enacted the current statute, granting cities and
towns the authority to create or abolish city and town courts for themselves.
Currently, any second- or third-class city or town can establish a city or
town court. 23 At the time of the survey (fall 1988), there were seventy-three
such courts. Like courts in other states, Indiana's city and town courts have
jurisdiction over all violations of city and town ordinances, misdemeanors,
and infractions. 24 City, but not town, courts also have concurrent jurisdiction
with other state courts in civil cases where the amount in controversy does
not exceed, in most courts, $500.25 These courts are not courts of record;26
appeals are to the circuit or superior courts and are tried de novo. 27 Judges
are elected for four-year terms in the general municipal election, running
under party labels as do all county-level judges in Indiana. The only
eligibility requirement concerns residency-the judge must be a registered
voter in the county to run for office and a resident of the city or town
during the term in office.28
Finally, we add a note about Indiana's criminal statutes. In Indiana,
crimes are defined as felonies or misdemeanors. 29 Misdemeanors are defined
as crimes for which a convicted person might be imprisoned for a fixed
22. Daniel, Foreword: Justice of the Peace Reform: The Legislative Response, 9 IND. L.
REv. 1, 4 (1975) (background to the legislative changes).
23. IND. CODE § 33-10.1-1-3 (1988). Indiana cities and towns differ with respect to
governmental structure ind size. A city must have at least 2000 residents. Id. § 36-4-1-4 (1988).
A first-class city has a population of at least 250,000. A second-class city has a population
between 249,999 and 35,000. A city with a population of less than 35,000 is a third-class city.
Towns are defined as "[o]ther municipalities of any population." Id. § 36-4-1-1(a) (1988).
Indianapolis, as Indiana's only first-class city, has a separate system of limited jurisdiction
courts which are not included in this study. Id. §§ 33-6-1-1 (Supp. 1990), 33-11.6-1-3 (1988).
24. Id. §§ 33-10.1-2-2 (Supp. 1990) (city courts), 33-10.1-2-7 (1988) (town courts).
25. Id. § 33-10.1-2-3.1 (1988). The subject matter is also limited so that the ordinary city
court does not have jurisdiction in actions for slander, libel, mortgage foreclosures, probate
matters, guardians, or actions in equity. Id.
City courts in counties with at least three second-class cities, such as Lake County, have
jurisdiction in civil cases where the amount in controversy does not exceed $3000. Id. § 33-
10.1-2-4 (Supp. 1990). City courts in third-class cities which are not the county seat have civil
jurisdiction where the amount in controversy does not exceed $1000. Id. § 33-10.1-2-5 (1988).
26. Id. § 33-10.1-5-7 (Supp. 1990) (the Carmel city court is the only exception).
27. Id. § 33-10.1-5-9 (1988). Subsection (a) clearly provides de novo procedures for an
appeal from a city court judgment. Subsection (b) is a parallel provision for town courts, but
it does not include the de novo language.
28. IND. CoNsT. art. 6, § 6 (residency); IND. CODE § 3-8-1-1.5 (1988) (voter registration).
Although the elected judge need not be, and often is not, a practicing attorney, the statute
requires a pro tem. judge of a city or town court to be a practicing attorney. Id. § 33-10.1-
2-1(b) (1988).
29. IND. CODE § 33-1-13-1 (1988).
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term of not more than a year and fined up to $5000.30 Typical misdemeanors
handled by Indiana city and town courts are driving while intoxicated and
driving while license is suspended. Excluded from the definition of crimes,
infractions are violations of a statute for which a person might be fined
but not imprisoned.31 Indiana created this new category of petty violations
in 1977 when it substantially revised and modernized its criminal code. 2
Probably the most common infraction handled by these city and town courts
is speeding.
There are several consequences that flow from Indiana's infractions
designation. First, because infractions are not considered crimes, the pro-
cedural protections granted by constitutions or state statutes do not apply. 33
Second, the burden of proof is a mere preponderance-of-the-evidence test
typical of civil cases rather than the more stringent beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt criminal standard. 34 On a more practical level, the money generated
by fines for infraction violations goes into the state's general fund3s and
not the common school fund, as Indiana's constitution requires of "all
fines assessed for breaches of the penal laws of the State. ' 36
As the name implies, ordinance violations are violations of the laws of a
local governmental unit (city, town, or county). In Indiana, local units may
not prescribe a penalty of more than $2500 or a penalty of imprisonment
for ordinance violations. Furthermore, local units do not have "[t]he power
to prescribe a penalty for conduct constituting a crime or infraction. 37
B. Data
In the fall of 1988, we mailed a questionnaire, asking about workloads,
hours of operation, budgets, relations with the community, training needs
and resources, and judge's background, to all city and town court judges
in the state.38 Sixty-five of the seventy-three judges (89%) responded.
30. Id. § 35-50-3-2 (1988) (Class A misdemeanor); Id. § 35-50-3-3 (1988) (for a Class B
misdemeanor, up to 180 days and $1000 fine); Id. § 35-50-3-4 (1988) (for a Class C
misdemeanor, up to sixty days and a $500 fine).
31. Id. § 33-1-13-1 (1988). In 1981, the state legislature added many infractions by
decriminalizing many traffic offenses, designating several other actions as infractions, and
lowering the status of some existing nontraffic offenses. Act of April 29, 1981, Pub. L. No.
108, 1981 Ind. Acts 1108. Maximum fines for infractions are found in IND. CODE § 34-4-32-
4 (Supp. 1990).
32. Act of April 21, 1977, Pub. L. No. 313, § 1, 1977 Ind. Acts 1434.
33. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 9-4-7-9 (1988) (rights of misdemeanants in traffic cases).
34. Id. § 34-4-32-1(d) (Supp. 1990).
35. Id. § 34-4-32-4(i) (1989).
36. IND. CONST. art. 8, § 2.
37. IND. CODE § 36-1-3-8(8) (Supp. 1990).
38. When possible, we adopted Professor Provine's wording in her survey of town and
village judges in New York state. D. PROVINE, supra note 1, at 191-97. We pretested the
questionnaire with a local state court judge and with the president of the Indiana City and
Town Court Judges' Association. Prior to receiving the mailed questionnaire, each judge
received letters from the Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court and the president of the
City and Town Court Judges' Association urging cooperation.
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Information about caseloads and court and community finances came from
public records. We interviewed sixteen judges and observed both lawyer and
nonlawyer judges from a variety of courts and communities, including
urban, rural, and suburban settings; courts located in and outside the county
seat; and courts in counties with only one and with more than one city or
town court.
II. INDIANA'S CITY AND TowN COURTS
A. General Description
1. Courts
Of the seventy-three city and town courts in Indiana, fifty are city courts
and twenty-three are town courts. As Table 1 shows, both the courts and
their communities are diverse. Forty-one of Indiana's ninety-two counties
have at least one city or town court. The courts are found in both the
smallest towns and in the most urbanized areas of the state. The mean
population of communities with city and town courts is 13,968, but popu-
lations range from 458 to 151,953. One-third of the courts are located in
county seats. Thus, the courts are neither exclusively small town phenomena
nor solely conveniences for citizens located far from state courts.39
Together these courts heard 205,100 cases in 1988 which account for
about 14% of all cases filed in the state.40 Although the average number
of filings per court is 3006, filings range from under 100 to over 15,000
cases per year.
This caseload is primarily criminal. 4' The courts do little civil work (5%,
on average, for city courts), but the percent varies from 0% in many city
courts to 90% in one. Judges report that about 68% of all criminal cases
filed are infractions, 22% misdemeanors, and 10% local ordinance viola-
tions. Traffic offenses constitute the bulk of the work. Other than traffic-
39. The communities with courts differ among themselves and, as far as we can tell, do
not differ in any obvious, systematic way from cities and towns that do not have them. See
infra Part II.B.
40. 1 DMSION oF STATE CouRT ADMINISTRATION, INDIANA JuDiciAL REPORT 49 (1988)
[hereinafter INDIANA JuDIcIAL REPORT].
41. We define criminal to include misdemeanors, infractions, and ordinance violations.
Felonies, of course, are excluded because they are beyond the jurisdiction of these courts. We
include infractions and ordinance violations despite the fact that they are statutorily defined
as civil cases. See Carson v. State, 459 N.E.2d 734 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (infractions); Viccaro
v. City of Fort Wayne, 449 N.E.2d 1161 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (ordinances). We want to
distinguish them from disputes between private parties that constitute the usual meaning of
civil matters; moreover, infractions are treated as criminal cases in other states. See, e.g.,
OHio Rv. CODE ANN. §§ 2901.02, 4511.99 (Anderson 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-8-152(b)
(1988).
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics on Selected Variables
for City and Town Courts
Variable Mean St. Dev. Minin
Filings* 3005.8 $3290.8
Civilb 5.0% 13.4
Criminal
Misdemeanor 22.6% 22.5
Infractions 67.2% 28.1
Ordinance
Violations 7.4% 14.6
Population 13969 24079 45
Hours/week 9.6 10.0
Filings per capita 0.7 1.1
Total Revenue $156513 $145580 $23,
a Annual Report. Indiana Judicial Report. 1988.
I Only city courts have civil jurisdiction. See note a, above.
um
6.0
0.0
0.0
8
1.0
0.01
4
related offenses, the judges report alcohol-related
disorderly conduct, and battery as common cases.
Maximum
15220
90.0
90.0 63
100.0 63
59
90.0 64
151953 65
40.0 64
5.3 64
$689409
offenses, conversion,
The courts also differ with respect to hours of operation, budgets, and
facilities. Typically, these are part-time courts, in session an average of nine
or ten hours a week. About 20% are in session less than two hours a week,
and another 7% are virtually full time, in operation thirty or more hours
a week. Unlike general jurisdiction courts, evening sessions are common. 42
All but one of the judges hold court in a public building, although we
observed considerable differences in the formality, comfort, and attractive-
ness of the quarters communities provide. 43
In 1988, Indiana's city and town courts generated an average annual
revenue of $157,531, with a range of $234 to $689,409. Court expenditures
varied similarly from $500 to almost $350,000 per year, with a mean of
about $43,000. Personnel costs, including the judges' salaries, make up the
largest component of court budgets. Indeed, for many courts, the only
42. Our questionnaire did not ask whether court sessions were day or evening, but some
respondents mentioned their evening sessions. Moreover, the courts of all the judges we
interviewed held at least some of their sessions in the evening. Evening sessions were seen as
a convenience to citizens, law enforcement officers, and judges.
43. We asked whether court was held in a public building because of the image of a justice
of the peace holding court in his living room. It is not uncommon, however, for the court to
be located in the same building as the police. As one judge whose court had moved from the
police station to a newly renovated city building pointed out, having the court and the police
in the same building has pluses and minuses for the court. Although location in the police
station provides security for court personnel and easy access to traffic records, it symbolically
identifies the court with the police. Other judges also mentioned the importance of maintaining
not only the substance but also the appearance of independence from the police.
[Vol. 67:59
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budgeted item is the judge's salary. The average judge's salary was $9,865
with a range of $500 to $40,000 for the year.4 Despite this variation in
dollars spent, most judges were satisfied with the financial support their
courts received.
2. Judges
The judges who served on these courts had varied backgrounds, education,
experience on the bench, and political and social ties. The overwhelming
majority were men; nine were women. The youngest judge was twenty-six
and the oldest seventy-four, with a mean age of forty-nine. Mean length of
service was seven years. Judges tended to be long-term residents of their
communities (on average 33 years), and over half reported that their parents
had lived in the community as well. Although most were active in civic,
charitable, fraternal, and social organizations, a substantial minority (28%)
reported no organizational memberships. Many judges are isolated even in
their courtrooms, working alone, while others are fully integrated into the
local legal community.45
About two-fifths (42%) of the judges were lawyers. Given the argument
that nonlawyers hold office where no lawyers are available, we were some-
what surprised to find only a mild correlation between the size of the place
and whether the judge is trained as a lawyer (r=.18), and no relationship
between a court's being located in the county seat and having a lawyer
judge (r= .02). Nor does there appear to be any trend toward or away from
electing legally trained judges; about 30% of the newest judges were lawyers,
and about 25% of those on the bench ten years or more were lawyers.
In addition to lawyers, the most common occupations were teacher and
former law enforcement officer. One-fifth (21%) of all judges currently
have no additional occupation. Mean education for the nonlawyer judges
was two years of college, and over a quarter of these (27%) had some
training beyond the baccalaureate. All but one were high school graduates.
Almost half the judges (49%) identify as Republicans, 41% as Democrats,
and 10% as independents. Although the judges are certainly more active
politically than ordinary citizens-10% held some other public office before
becoming judge-they seem less so than one might expect given the percep-
tion of the judgeships as patronage plums. This impression was reinforced
by subsequent interviews. We found the following: differences in party
control of the judgeship and city government, judges who retained the clerk
of a previous judge of another party, lifelong Democrats who ran as
44. Four judges were not paid annual salaries; one was paid $16.00 per court session, and
three were paid a mean of $4.63 per case filed.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 50-53.
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Republicans, and even a judge who was unsure of his opponent's party
affiliation.
B. Types of Caseloads
Is there a pattern to the diversity of caseloads? The interviews suggested
that several quite different entities share the label "city and town court."
Moreover, these differences seemed to be associated with the particular mix
of misdemeanors, infractions, ordinance violations, and civil cases the courts
heard. Since we did not know, ex ante, how many different patterns existed
or the exact nature of the patterns, we used cluster analysis to group the
courts according to the mix of cases they hear. 46 We analyzed judges'
responses to questions regarding the proportion of civil versus criminal cases
on the court's docket and, among the criminal cases, the proportions of
misdemeanors, infractions, and ordinance violations. From the results of
the cluster analysis, we identified five clusters of courts with distinctive
caseloads. 47
Table 2 shows the characteristics of caseloads of the courts in each of
the five clusters and the labels we assigned to them. The clusters are: (1)
general traffic courts, (2) misdemeanor courts, (3) infractions courts, (4)
ordinance courts, and (5) civil courts.
As can be seen from Table 2, the two large and three small clusters hear
quite different mixes of cases. Most distinctive is the single court in the
civil cluster, which has an almost entirely civil docket. 48 While the mean
percentage of civil work for all city courts is only about 5o0, 90% of this
court's docket is civil.
The ordinance cluster has only two members. Ordinance violations, which
on average account for about 7% of city and town court dockets, make up
nearly half (48%) of the criminal caseload in these courts. The remainder
of their criminal caseload is fairly evenly divided between misdemeanors
(20Oo) and infractions (33%1o). These courts hear about 8% civil cases.
Courts in the infractions cluster specialize in relatively minor traffic
offenses. On average, 93°o of their cases are infractions. They do almost
46. Cluster analysis uses scores on a number of variables (in our analysis, the proportions
of various case types) to identify groups. Each court is first defined as a separate cluster. At
each successive stage, the nearest two clusters, as defined by their scores on the variables of
interest, are combined. For a general discussion of cluster analysis, see H. ROMESBURG, CLUSTER
ANALYSIS FOR RESEARCHERS (1984).
Our measure of distance was the sum of the squared differences across all the caseload
variables. We defined the distance between clusters as the average distance of all pairs of cases
in which one member of the pair is from each of the clusters.
47. The five-cluster solution produced the smallest number of relatively homogeneous (and
therefore interpretable) groups.
48. Only if all the courts are grouped in a single cluster will this court be joined with any
other court.
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TABLE 2
Mean Percentages of Case Types within Clusters
Cluster Number and Label
1 2 3 4 5
Case Type General Misdemeanor Infraction Ordinance Civil
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
(s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.)
CIVIL, 3% 8% 1% 8% 90%
(6) (18) (3) (11) (0)
CRIMINAL 97% 92% 99% 92% 10%
Misdemeanorsb 31% 78% 4% 20% 0%(11) (12) (4) (7) (0)
Infractionsb  64% 13% 93% 33% 10%(11I) (6) (4) (11) 0
Ordinance
Violations' 6% 9% 2% 48% 90%
(5) (12) (2) (4) (0)
Number of
Courts in Cluster 29 5 22 2 1
, Percent of total caseload.
b Percent of criminal caseload.
no civil work. The infractions cluster has twenty-two courts and is the
second largest.
Courts in the misdemeanor cluster hear high proportions of misdemeanors
(78% of the criminal caseload, on average) and low proportions of infrac-
tions (13%) and ordinance violations (9%). The mean percentage of civil
cases is 8%, but the cluster is heterogeneous in this regard. This is the
largest of the small clusters (five courts).
With twenty-nine courts, the general traffic cluster is the largest. Infrac-
tions (64%) are the most common criminal case heard in these courts, but
unlike the courts in the infractions cluster, these courts hear a substantial
proportion (31%) of misdemeanors. Yet the nature of the misdemeanors
they hear makes them unlike the courts in the misdemeanor cluster. The
questionnaires asked judges to name their most common criminal case. Of
the twenty-five charges mentioned first by judges from courts in this cluster,
64% are traffic-related. In contrast, no judge from the misdemeanor cluster
mentioned a traffic-related charge as his or her most common criminal case.
These courts hear few ordinance violations (6%) and even fewer civil cases
(2%). Thus, these courts are essentially traffic courts, which hear a mixture
of both more and less serious traffic cases.
There are other differences among the clusters. Table 3 presents descriptive
statistics on several dimensions of size and court finance. As can be seen
from Table 3, infractions courts tend to be small courts in small places.
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Thirteen (64%) are town courts, and the mean population of their com-
munities is under 5000. In 1988, the mean number of cases filed was only
1790, and the courts averaged only 8.4 hours in session per week, though
the variation within the cluster on these variables is large. Case filings in
these courts are large relative to community size. While courts in other
clusters average under 0.4 filings per capita, infractions courts average 1.3
filings for every resident. These courts also produce more revenue for their
communities. At $19,903, their mean "net revenue"-that is, the local share
of total revenue less total expenditures-is higher than for any other cluster.4 9
Courts in the infractions cluster also are distinguished by the isolation of
their judges. The courts, grouped according to the frequency with which
prosecutors, public defenders, and law enforcement personnel appear in
TABLE 3
Mean and Standard Deviations of Court Characteristics
by Caseload Cluster Membership
Cluster
1 2 3 4 5
Variance General Misdemeanor Infraction Ordinance Civil
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
(s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.)
Filings 4106 3584 2126 2154 895
(3987) (4203) (2152) (564) (0)
Hours per week 9.6 11.6 8.4 17.0 15.0
(7.7) (13.3) (10.6) (1.4) (0.0)
Population 22.05 19.04 4.67 17.36 12.99
(thousands) (33.34) (13.-19) (5.48) (1.28) (0.0)
Filings per hour 479.54 406.89 417.5 128.53 59.67(349.5) (387.5) (453.0) (48.9) (0.0)
Filings per capita 0.40 0.23 1.3 0.12 0.069(0.45) (0.23) (1.73) (0.21) (0.0)
Total revenue $198.4 $120.9 $129.7 $145.1 $20.61
(thousands) (171.2) (64.3) (118.4) (78.6) (0.0)
Profit $4211 -$62222 $19903 $16132 -$32147(47815) (130110) (45875) (28340) (0.0)
Revenue per filing $0.63 -$13.55 $7.86 $19.80 $43.00
(15.62) (17.52) (30.02) (11.59) (0.0)
Revenue/City 0.018 0.006 0.074 0.003 0.01
Budget (0.05) (0.03) (0.09) (0.01) (0.0)
Expenditures per $14.3 $38.9 $12.6 $19.8 $43.0
filing (15.6) (26.5) (18.0) (5.6) (0.0)
N=29 N=5 N=22 N=2 N=I
Net revenue = local share of total revenue-total expenditures.
49. We discuss the financial aspects of Indiana's city and town courts in Part II.C.
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their courtrooms,50 fell roughly into thirds on these dimensions: one group
(n = 16) sees the full complement of legal and law enforcement professionals
on a daily or weekly basis; a second (n=20) sees the prosecutor and law
enforcement officers but not the city attorney or the public defender; 5' and
a third (n = 17) sees none of these persons on a daily or weekly basis. Ten
of the infractions judges fall into this last category. The reason for their
isolation probably lies in the nature of their caseloads. Because infractions
are not crimes in Indiana, neither prosecutor nor public defender is required;
even law enforcement officers appear infrequently.
The judges of infractions courts also have few informal contacts with the
legal community. A cluster analysis based on responses to questionnaire
items concerning the frequency with which the judges see other judges,
prosecutors, city attorneys, and public defenders outside their courts also
produced three groups. The majority of judges (thirty of the fifty-three for
whom complete information on these variables was available) see no other
legal professionals regularly. Another large group (n = 17) sees not only
other legal professionals but other judges as well. The remaining six judges
regularly see lawyers but not other judges.5 2 Judges from the infractions
cluster are particularly unlikely to see other judges.53
In contrast to the infractions cluster, communities in the general traffic
cluster are larger and more likely to be cities (83%). The courts in the
general traffic cluster handle a much larger volume of business. Although
these courts typically produce revenue, it averages only one-fifth that of
infractions courts ($4211 compared to $19,903). Again, in contrast to the
judges from the infractions cluster, judges in the general traffic cluster are
not isolated. Half regularly see all potential participants in their courtrooms,
and over 90% see at least the prosecutors and law enforcement officers
daily or weekly. These judges also are much more likely to see the prose-
cutor, city attorney, public defender, and other judges outside their court-
rooms.
Courts in the misdemeanor cluster tend also to be large-volume courts
located in larger communities. With mean filings of 3584, they are second
only to those in the general traffic cluster in numbers of filings. Unlike
50. To identify groups of courts, we used cluster analysis of questionnaire responses on
the frequency with which various participants are present.
51. The absence of a public defender in court does not say anything about the frequency
with which privately retained lawyers are present.
52. In a logit estimation of an equation with this three-category grouping as the dependent
variable, being a lawyer significantly increases the probability that a judge will see other legal
professionals outside the court setting, and being a judge from an infractions court significantly
decreases the probability that a judge will see other judges.
53. Although there is considerable overlap between infractions courts and the "being alone
in court" cluster, there is little relationship between the other caseload clusters and our "who
is in court" clusters described here. Again, the court's physical setting probably affects who
the judges see outside the court as well.
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courts in the two clusters just described, courts in the misdemeanor cluster
tend to cost their communities money rather than produce revenue for
them. While the judges are not isolated in their courtrooms, they are
unlikely to see the prosecutor, public defender, city attorney, or other judges
outside their courtrooms.
The two courts in the ordinance cluster are similar to each other and
different from other courts in that they are low-volume courts in session
numerous hours a week. Courts in this cluster are heterogeneous with
respect to revenue; they are to be found both among the costliest courts
and the most profitable courts. The single civil court spends more per filing
($43) than any other court.
To provide a context for the caseload variation in city and town courts,
we examined the county courts' caseloads as the most comparable jurisdic-
tions in the state court system.5 4 On average, county courts hear considerably
more civil cases (25%) than do city courts. 55 Across the state, misdemeanors,
infractions, and ordinance violations account for about 24%, 70%, and
5%, respectively, of the criminal filings in county courts. Though these
figures represent somewhat more misdemeanors and fewer ordinance viol-
ations than are heard by city and town courts, overall, the distributions are
quite similar. But there is county-level variation: most courts hear mainly
infractions, some almost all civil cases, and a few even hear mostly ordinance
violations.
We also compared county court caseloads in counties with city and town
courts and those without any city and town courts. County court caseloads
in counties with city and town courts are, if anything, more varied. More-
over, there is no simple relationship between what the county courts hear
and whether the county has city or town courts within its boundaries. In
some counties, the city and town courts of a county and the county courts
hear similar distributions of cases. In others, each seems to specialize; for
example, in several counties, city and town courts specialize in infractions
while the county courts hear misdemeanors and civil cases. But there is no
single division of labor. In one county with several city and town courts
with large general traffic caseloads, the county court hears civil cases and
ordinance violations. Yet, in another, where city and town courts hear
54. The idea to make this comparison comes from Baar, supra note 15.
These comparison data are new civil, small claims, misdemeanor, infraction, and ordinance
violation filings reported for county courts and the "county court function" of circuit and
superior courts in 1988. INDIANA JUDICIAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 49. This jurisdiction is
the most comparable to that of city and town courts, although county court jurisdiction
includes Class D felonies and has a higher civil limit. In the text, our reference here to county
courts includes circuit and superior courts exercising their "county court function." See supra
note 21.
55. See infra text accompanying note 72 through the end of Part II.D. (the dearth of civil
cases in city courts).
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relatively high proportions of misdemeanors and civil cases, the county
court hears more infractions than average. Such county variation reinforces
the notion that having jurisdiction does not mean that it will be used fully
or used in the same way in different places. 56
In the face of such variation in caseloads, the urge to offer explanations
and predictions is inevitable but risky. A well-specified model explaining
caseload patterns would require data on these courts over time as well as a
broader sample including communities which never established courts and
those which had but then abolished them.5 7 So far the focus of the study
has been on the discovery and mapping of variation in city and town courts.
We presently lack the necessary data to test causal relationships. Neverthe-
less, we can offer some evidence on where one should (and should not)
look for explanation.
The mix of cases a court hears should depend on jurisdictional constraints,
environmental factors, and the interests and abilities of the judge.5 8 For
communities that currently have city or town courts, the data contains some
measures of these judicial and environmental variables. Thus, to test this
expectation we predicted caseload cluster membership from specific variables
reflecting these general influences.5 9 Several measures of the court's envi-
ronment are: (1) whether the court is located in a city or a town, (2)
whether the city or town is in a metropolitan area, (3) whether, if a town,
it is located near a major highway, (4) the city's or town's population, and
(5) the net revenue per filing. Variables reflecting characteristics of the
judge are whether the judge is a lawyer and a measure of the judge's
56. See Daniels, Ladders and Bushes: The Problem of Caseloads and Studying Court
Activities Over Time, 1984 Am. B. FOUND. REs. J. 751 (caseload development over time is in
response to localized rather than broad general influences).
57. We see that phase as the next step in our continued study of limited jurisdiction courts.
58. Numerous scholars have sought explanations for the size and nature of courts' caseloads
in environmental influences. For a small sample of quite different approaches to the use of
environmental explanations, see J. EISENSTEIN, R. FLEMMING & P. NARDULLI, THE CONTOURS
OF JUSTICE: COMMnrTIES AND THEIR COURTS (1988); Daniels, Civil Litigation in Illinois Trial
Courts: An Eiploration of Urban-Rural Differences, 4 LAW & PoL'Y Q. 190 (1982); Moody
& Marvell, Appellate and Trial Court Caseload Growth: A Pooled Time-Series-Cross-Section
Analysis, 3 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 143 (1987). See also J. JACOBY, TIE AMERICAN
PROSECTrroR (1980) (the effects of environment on the prosecutorial function).
Marvell, The Impact of Jurisdiction Amounts on Trial Court Caseloads, 69 JUDICATURE 367
(1986), examines the effects of changes in jurisdictional limits in limited jurisdiction courts on
trial courts' civil caseloads. See also J. EISENSTEIN, R. FLEMMING & P. NARDULLI, supra
(discussing the impact of jurisdictional differences on the criminal side).
59. We do this by specifying and estimating a qualitative response (logit) model. The
outcomes are scored 0 = general traffic, I = misdemeanor, 2 = infractions, and 3 =
ordinances, so that the general traffic cluster becomes the comparison category. We excluded
the civil cluster from the analysis because it contains only one case. For a general treatment
of qualitative response models, see G. MADDALA, LIMITED-DEPENDENT AND QUALITATIVE
VARIABLES IN ECONOMETRICS (1983).
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energy. 60 Jurisdictional differences are reflected in whether the court is in a
city or town.
We find that the ability to predict cluster membership from these variables
is limited. We start with what does not predict the nature of a court's
caseload: whether the judge is a lawyer. Previous research has shown little
difference between lawyers and nonlawyers in the operation of courts or
the outcome of cases, although an assumed difference remains a persistent
stereotype.6' Our results indicate that having a lawyer judge does not affect
what kinds of cases are brought to a court either.
Nor do these variables predict whether a court will be specialized in
infractions or hear a more general mix of traffic cases. None of the estimated
effects for the variables (town, highway town, metropolitan area, popula-
tion, revenue per filing, lawyer judges, or judge's energy) reach conventional
levels of significance. Whether the court is located in a city or a town,
however, comes close. 62 If this latter effect is real, town courts are more
likely to be in the infractions cluster. We surmise that the effect is real and
that it has to do with the potential of these courts to generate revenue. But
there are, of course, courts in the infractions cluster that do not produce
revenue and courts in other clusters that produce revenue. 63
These variables do better predicting membership in the misdemeanor and
ordinance clusters. Courts in communities adjacent to big cities are more
likely to be in the misdemeanor cluster or the ordinance cluster; that is, to
have caseloads dominated by nontraffic misdemeanor offenses or to hear
unusually high proportions of city ordinance violations. It is proximity to
an urban center that is important; the size of the city or town itself has no
effect. The measure of judges' energy also distinguishes among caseload
patterns but not as expected. Higher scores on the energy measure make it
less likely that a court hears misdemeanor or ordinance caseloads as opposed
to general traffic caseloads. But these effects are not as noteworthy as the
relationships that do not appear, namely that neither legal training nor
profitability determines the nature of the caseload these courts hear.
60. Some judges talked with pride about the growth of the caseload during their tenure
and innovations they had introduced. For other judges, the court was clearly a sideline; growth
was seen as a burden. These judges were generally uninterested in expanding the courts into
new areas.
The "energy" measure combines information on occupation and age. It gives highest scores
to judges with no additional occupation and higher scores to judges in general business and
blue collar occupations than to those in law or teaching. Judges under age sixty-two receive
lower scores than those over on the grounds that a judge's primary occupation demands more
attention at an earlier stage in the life cycle.
61. See sources cited supra note 6.
62. The estimated coefficient is 2.3, with a standard error of 1.2, at a significance level of
.06.
63. For further information about revenues, see infra Part II.C.
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C. Court Finances
Because these courts are conventionally viewed as existing to make money,
whether and how much revenue they actually produce is important. We
asked judges to indicate whether they believed their communities saw the
courts as making money, breaking even, or costing money. About half said
their communities believe their court makes money for the community, yet
20% said the community thinks the court costs money. Whatever the
perception, public financial data show that most courts at least break even.
Local communities derive revenues from their courts through state-dictated
court costs6 (fines for infractions or misdemeanor convictions, on the other
FIGURE 1
Histogram of City Court and Town Court Net Revenuea: 1988
25+
18+
12+
6+ 
hM
-3000000b -50000 -35000 -20000 -5000M 10000 25000 40000 55000 70000
to to to to to to to to to to
-50000 -35000 -20000 -5000 10000 25000 40000 55000 70000 100000
Frequency 3 0 4 2 25 14 7 5 2 2
Percentage 5% 0% 6% 3% 40% 22% 11% 8% 3% 3
,Net revenue is defined as the local share of revenues generated in 1988 minus total court
expenditures in 1988.
b Net revenues of two of the courts in this interval are between -$100,000 and -$200,000; the
third court's net revenues are $296,270.
'Twenty-one of the courts in this interval have net revenues between -5,000 and $5,000.
64. The state fixes court costs for misdemeanors at $100. IND. CODE § 33-19-5-1 (1988).
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hand, go to the state). 65 Mean net revenue for these courts is $4898. 6 As
can be seen from Figure 1, net revenues for 40% of the courts are between
-$5000 and +$10,000, but the overall range is considerable. Some courts
brought in nearly $100,000 in 1988, while others cost their communities as
much as $292,670. The twenty-five courts in the modal category are quite
diverse. The populations of their communities vary from under 1000 to over
40,000. With mean filings of 1558, they are smaller than average (3006),
but they range from less than 100 to more than 12,000 cases in 1988. Their
mean expenditures per filing range is $19.36.
Nine courts cost their communities more than $5000. Three of these have
negative net revenues in excess of $100,000-greater than any court's rev-
enues on the positive side. These three courts are all located in metropolitan
areas. Their caseloads are large (12,386 cases, on average) and contain
larger shares of civil (28%) and misdemeanor work (47%) than other courts.
Although they produce substantial local revenue, they also spend a great
deal with a mean total expenditure in 1988 of about $300,000.
On the other side of the continuum, thirty courts produce net revenues
in excess of $10,000. Since it is difficult to determine the relative value of
these sums in the absence of information about city and town finances
more generally, we use the city's or town's approved budget appropriations 67
as a norm against which to judge the significance of court revenues. From
this perspective, court revenues (positive or negative) are, on the average,
about 3% of the total city or town budget. But the distribution is very
skewed, with court revenue accounting for under 3% in most communities
and for as much as 31 % in others.
The net revenues of twelve of these thirty courts make up 5% or more
of their communities' budgets.68 This group is of special interest because
In 1989, the Legislature raised it to $110. Act of May 5, 1989, Pub. L. No. 284, § 6, 1989
Ind. Acts 1982, 1986. Court costs for infractions are $50. IND. CODE § 33-19-5-2 (1988). Costs
collected by city and town courts are distributed as follows: 55% to the state, 15% to the
county, and 30% to the city or town. Id. § 33-19-7-4 (1988).
65. Money generated by fines for misdemeanors goes to the state common school fund.
IND. CONST. art. 8, § 2. Money generated by fines for infractions goes to the state general
fund. IND. CODE § 34-4-32-4(i) (1988). Money from fines for ordinance violations is returned
to the local governmental unit.
66. We use the local share of court-generated revenue minus total court expenditure to
define "net revenue." Local revenues are the city's or town's share of court costs. Court
revenues come from the local share of court costs in criminal and civil cases and from fines
for ordinance violations.
67. In order to develop a standard measure of city and town budgets, we took the sum
of the approved budget appropriations for general, parks, police pension, and fire pension
funds for each governmental unit. We then calculated net revenue or costs (local revenue
minus court expenditure) as a fraction of the approved budget appropriations.
68. We chose 5% of the city budget, because 5% of the city or town budget would be a
noticeable contribution which, we assume, if removed from city or town revenues, would be
missed. It also conformed to a natural break in the data; while the mean percentage of net
revenue as a fraction of city budget is 15% for courts above the 5% line, it is only 1% for
those below.
[Vol. 67:59
CITY AND TOWN COURTS
these courts embody the most common stereotype of city and town courts-
that is, that they are money-makers. Indeed, their mean contribution to city
or town budgets is 15%. As one might expect, these courts are located in
small communities with small city or town budgets. Their mean population
is 2279, and the largest has a population of only 4500. Nine of the twelve
are in towns. For net revenues of the size produced by these courts to be
significant, the local budget must also be small. The average budget for
these twelve communities is about $300,000 and ranges from $78,000 to
$615,000.
Although the communities are small, the courts' caseloads are large. Per
capita filings are ten times those of other courts (2.2 as compared to .23).
These courts also spend less than other courts, with a mean expenditure
per filing of $8 as compared with $20 for other courts. Most are infractions
courts. Eight of the twelve courts fall in the infractions cluster; another
three are in the general traffic cluster, and one is in the misdemeanor
cluster.69
The stereotype that judges in such courts will be nonlawyers also holds
true in this group of twelve courts. Only one of the twelve is a lawyer.70
What distinguishes this subgroup of twelve, however, is their meager city
or town budget. There are sixteen additional courts that produce as much
revenue (more than $10,000) but do so in a city or town with a substantial
budget. Of these sixteen courts, nine (56%) have lawyer judges.
With a mean tenure of nine years on the bench, these twelve judges have
served slightly longer than other judges. They also score higher on our
"energy" measure. Judges in this group of courts are likely to be isolated,
but they are no more so than judges in other small infractions courts. Thus
it is the type of caseload, not whether the town depends on the court for
a substantial portion of its revenue, that affects who will be present in
court.
With these "large revenue-small budget courts" we come closest to the
stereotype of city and town courts. What is interesting, however, is not that
there is a grain of truth in the stereotype but that it is only a grain. To
the extent that the stereotype fits, it fits only twelve of the seventy-three
courts.
D. Civil Work
One aspect of these courts that fits the conventional picture, yet is
puzzling, is their lack of civil work. The state intended city courts to hear
69. These courts do little civil work, but, for the most part, this is because 75o of the
courts are town courts, which have no civil jurisdiction.
70. Other than being much less likely to be lawyers and more likely to be retired, however,
their occupational distribution resembles that of other judges. Five have no occupation other
than judge. Four are in white collar business occupations, and one holds a teaching position
and one a blue collar job. Of the five with no other current occupation, two are former law
enforcement officers, one a former teacher, and two previously held blue collar jobs.
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civil cases. In fact, the legislature went out of its way in distinguishing
among city courts, setting different jurisdiction limits. 71 Thus, the obvious
question is why most courts do not hear civil cases. Whether they do so is
not related to whether the judge is a lawyer, to the city population, to the
availability of a small claims court, or to location in a county seat.
When asked why the court did not hear civil cases, judges typically
responded that their court was not set up to handle civil cases. The judges
maintained civil work requires additional paper work and support staff (for
example, "we'd have to hire another bailiff to deliver our summons' 72 or
"the sheriff won't serve papers for the court"). 73 Yet courts that do hear
civil cases find means of overcoming such problems even within limited
budgets.
The judges also stated that small claims courts are set up specifically to
handle the same kind of civil cases. This latter response, which implies that
city courts are inappropriate and unnecessary to hear such disputes, is
curious given the oft-stated justification for city courts as a convenience
(even if redundant) for local citizens.
Thus, we looked elsewhere for explanations about the lack of interest in
civil cases. Although court costs for civil cases and infractions are about
the same, civil cases may consume more resources because it takes longer
to hear civil cases or involves more paper work for the court system. If, as
the critics charge, city courts are interested only in making money, civil
work may be less attractive than criminal because it is less profitable.
Alternatively, lawyer judges may hesitate to do civil work because they
face a conflict of interest. Currently, lawyer judges do not practice criminal
law. If their courts began to hear civil cases, the lawyer judges may worry
that they would have to give up handling civil cases as well, making it
impossible to both practice law and be a city court judge. Yet, the civil
jurisdiction of city courts is quite limited, not only in terms of dollar
amount but also in terms of subject matter. 74 Within the range of excluded
subject matter, it may be possible to carve a part-time law practice. Even
though a part-time practice may be possible, it may not be easy to identify
cases fitting within its bounds in advance or to allow enough flexibility for
the practice to be feasible financially. Whatever the merit to the lawyer
judges' concerns about civil cases, none of this explains why nonlawyer
judges do not hear civil cases.
An explanation for the failure of more nonlawyer judges to hear civil
cases may be that they think civil cases are too hard. The applicable law
in criminal cases for city and town courts, in fact, is not very complicated.
71. IND. CODE §§ 33-10.1-2-3.1 to -5 (1988). See also supra note 25 and accompanying
text.
72. Interview 15. Interview notes are on file with the authors in Bloomington, Indiana.
73. Id.
74. See IND. CODE §§ 33-10.1-2-3.1 to -5 (1988).
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Finding facts or dispensing sanctions may be difficult, and the laws are
numerous (if not overwhelming), but what the criminal law says is not very
difficult. In contrast, the law in civil cases is complicated, or at a minimum
unpredictable and wide-ranging. Indeed, for lawyers and nonlawyers alike,
identifying real winners and losers, many of whom may be friends, in civil
cases may be harder not only in a cognitive sense but also interpersonally.
Whether courts hear civil cases suggests not only how these courts define
themselves but also how others see them. We have no data on why litigants
chose not to file civil cases in city courts, but there may be several
explanations. The very limited dollar amount in controversy ($500 in most
city courts) may be a significant deterrent. The availability of small claims
courts, with lower court costs and fewer procedural hurdles, may be another,
or it may be that custom suggests the city court would be hostile to civil
actions.
E. Summary
What is most striking about the work these courts do is its noticeable
diversity. Some courts do no civil work, while other courts almost entirely
hear civil cases. There are courts that handle traffic cases, whereas others
do not. Certain courts produce large revenues that will be meaningful to
their respective city or town. Yet other courts have no staffs or serve an
outreach function by being located in a nonpopulous community away from
the county seat. The nature of the courts can differ within counties as well
as across the state. Identifying and understanding this diversity is important
not only for its own sake,7 5 but also because it allows us to explore the
nature of localism illustrated by these courts.
III. IMPLICATIONS
At the outset, we argued for the relevance to city and town courts of
three themes in writing on community and democracy: local institutions as
schools of citizenship, tensions over local responsiveness, and the loss of
local autonomy. While the observation that, as political institutions, courts
reflect "the dominant assumptions, attitudes, and political choices of the
community ' 76 applies to all courts, it does so with special force to the
locally created and financed courts we have studied here. The responsiveness
75. We have found that others have trouble accepting that these courts do not fit the
conventional picture or even fit neatly into two or three main types. Sometimes an observer
thinks our data must be wrong, but more commonly, comments suggest a simple failure to
recognize the picture we draw. The persistence of the view in the face of' contrary facts,
however, is interesting on its own.
76. J. ROBERTSON, RouGH JUsTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LOWER COURTS XXV (1974).
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of these courts to their communities is revealed in the variety we observed.
The statutorily defined jurisdictional space is only partially occupied, and
it is occupied differently by different courts. To be sure, the analysis of
caseloads reveals a strong tendency for these courts to be traffic courts.
But just as not all communities elect to have a city or town court, not all
those that have courts elect to emphasize traffic cases. Some, for example,
emphasize the enforcement of ordinance violations and misdemeanors. Yet
even a caseload composed almost entirely of traffic cases can serve interests
beyond the enforcement of speeding laws or the generation of revenue. 77
When judges talk about why their courts are important to their com-
munities, they often speak in terms of local sensitivity. Their use of the
term implies direct knowledge of local problems and people, either as
individuals or as groups ("teenagers in the Spring ' 78 or "loiterers on the
courthouse square," ' 79 for example). Moreover, local sensitivity means that
local problems are taken seriously. A common theme in the study of courts
is that court officials, as opposed to litigants, perceive much of the business
that comes to the courts as unworthy of the courts' attention. By defining
this business as "junk" or "kids' stuff," courts trivialize the problems of
ordinary citizens.80 The limited jurisdiction and local nature of these courts
allow them to attend to what general jurisdiction courts might regard as
trivial or routine. One judge, when asked why his community had established
a court, said, "[B]ecause we couldn't get anyone to enforce our ordi-
nances." ' 8' Another judge contrasted the experience of appearing in his court
on a traffic matter with that of appearing in the nearby metropolitan court
by saying that in the latter, "[Y]ou did not know that you violated the
law." '8 2 Teen drinking, old refrigerators left in front yards, neighborhood
disputes, and other problems can be addressed with the level of seriousness
the local community deems appropriate.
The flip side of local sensitivity is bias. Noting the greater homogeneity
and intimacy of relations in small communities, some authors are especially
77. Traffic laws might be used for social control of teenage drinking or of problems
generated by proximity to recreational areas, for example.
78. Interview 19.
79. Interview 15.
80. Such screening is especially characteristic of major trial courts in urban places, but it
also occurs in limited jurisdiction courts and in smaller places. See, e.g., McBarnet, Magistrates'
Courts and the Ideology of Justice, 8 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'y 181, 189-92 (1981); Yngvesson,
Legal Ideology and Community Justice in the Clerk's Office, 9 LEGAL STUD. F. 71 (1985);
Yngvesson, Making Law at the Doorway: The Clerk, the Court, and the Construction of
Community in a New England Town, 22 LAW & Soc'y REv. 409, 443 (1988).
81. Interview 3. Baar, supra note 15, at 25 argues that as the work of major trial courts
has become more routinized and therefore more like that of limited jurisdiction courts the
reasons for maintaining separate structures are disappearing. Yet it seems likely that the work
done in the city and town courts we study here will continue to look trivial when viewed
against the backdrop of the more serious caseloads of state courts.
82. Interview 4.
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suspicious of how judicial power is exercised in small places.8 3 Because we
do not analyze case outcomes, our data do not speak directly to the issue
of impartiality in decision making. Nonetheless, the interviews presented
judges who accept, in principle, a standard of impartiality. No doubt the
principle is easier to uphold than the practice. Yet judges were sensitive to
the special problems created by their local ties to their communities. Some
judges talked about impartiality as something one has to learn 4 and reported
feeling discomfort the first few times they ruled against friends or acquain-
tances. Other judges pointed to previous experiences, as law enforcement
officers, for example, that prepared them to ignore personal feelings. 5
Provine has argued that, as a culture, we have accepted and internalized
the legal model.8 6 But it is worth noting that this distanced, neutral model
of judging has itself come into question. 7 City and town court judges can
claim a special sensitivity to local problems and local values that may bring
their decision making closer to a model of empathic judging.
What we can conclude about law and justice lessons actually learned from
these courts is limited, because we did not study citizens' perceptions. We
do have some observations of court proceedings. In visits to these courts,
we observed dignified, courteous interactions. Given the full dockets of
some sessions, defendants were informed of their rights with surprising care.
Lawyer judges seemed confident of their ability to inform defendants
adequately. Several nonlawyer judges expressed concern about "doing it
right." One nonlawyer judge, dissatisfied with the clarity of the standard
appraisal of rights, explained how she had modified it to use language more
likely to be understood. Several judges revealed they purposely scheduled
particular cases late in a session so that defendants could learn from
observing a range of cases and dispositions.
For some judges, wearing a robe was important in establishing the
authority of the court. For others, not wearing a robe conveyed identification
with the community. One judge, who reported that he did not wear a robe
but "always wore a tie" when he held court, emphasized the congruence
between his own background and that of the majority of townspeople, when
83. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 11, at 63 ("The smaller the town, the more justice is a
matter of personal opinion in the community itself, rarely formalized, rarely examined, rarely
permanently established, depending on the sentiment of the moment."). J. MASBRiDGE, supra
note 8, at 283-87, quotes several authors on the existence of and reasons for homogeneity of
opinion in small towns but is much more sanguine about this homogeneity than are the others.
84. Indeed, many reported that impartiality was one of the hardest parts of doing their
job.
85. Sensitivity can also be used to distinguish between a system of judges and an admin-
istrative bureaucracy, which, in this context, can be claimed by outsiders as well as locals. For
example, one judge noted the problems caused for Illinois residents by differences between
Indiana and Illinois traffic laws and reporting requirements.
86. D. PROVINE, supra note 1, at 168-81.
87. See Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 1574 (1987).
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he said, "We're dirt farmers. My father was a dirt farmer, and that's what
we are here." 88
The most important lessons of these courts, however, may have as much
to do with community empowerment as with the court's setting or procedure.
With the loss of community power, 9 the existence of the court may mean
a great deal to community identity-much more than the money it generates.
Although outsiders may believe that city and town courts are powerful
because judgeships are important in local politics, what may be important
is the idea of decision making at the local level.
Professor Long argues that "[t]o the extent the city has lost function to
higher levels of government, the city, as a local territorial community, loses
its power to produce a normative structure." 9 The local functions of courts
seem especially relevant here. For many communities, as one judge put it,
the court is "essential for good government." 9' A community can use the
court to help define the kind of community it is.
This self-definition may involve, as it did for one town, the use of
ordinance violations to impose middle class standards of property mainte-
nance on "[p]eople who don't know how to live." ' 92 Or the court may be
a way of setting the community apart from other communities or the
surrounding county. For one community, the court and its building formed
the only city center for a patchwork of residential additions strung out
along a major commuting route. Another judge saw his court as serving a
growing, business-oriented, progressive community in contrast to the back-
water county in which it was located. Whatever the original reasons for
establishing a court, once established, the court may become important for
its role in reinforcing community identity. One may not approve of the
choices-for example, the choice to finance town government by processing
traffic infractions rather than by taxation-but political independence is the
exercise of choice.
Because these courts are embedded in local political culture, future inquiry
should expand the perspectives from which we view these courts to include
local governmental political elites and ordinary citizens. The examination
should include communities that once had courts but no longer do and
88. Interview 19.
89. The loss of community power we noted at the outset has probably been especially
acute for small cities and towns. E. LADD, IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA 82-84 (1969), argues that
towns are much less socially and economically independent than they once were because of
changes in transportation, communication, and a more nationalized economy. But the loss is
not so far in the past that there are not those who remember this independence and regret its
passing. See also Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and the Personal Injuries
in an American Community, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 551, 573-74 (1984) for a similar point.
90. Long, supra note 8, at 12.
91. Interview 15.
92. Id.
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those communities that have never had courts. Yet the most important
implication is that debates about the existence of these courts, or even their
reform, are political decisions involving competing values. They are not
simple, nor should they be made on narrow grounds.

